The part of Russia’s National Wealth Fund that the state can use to cover a budget deficit. At present this is mostly Chinese yuan and gold, unlike the illiquid part of the fund, which is invested in shares and infrastructure projects, among other things.

The larger this reserve, the longer the Russian budget can cover deficits, including while war spending is high, without relying entirely on new taxes or borrowing. A fall in liquid assets narrows the Kremlin’s financial cushion and makes it more expensive, and harder, to keep spending at the current level.

↑ 5 A smaller reserve weakens Russia’s ability to cover the budget deficit painlessly, but on its own it does not remove the ability to finance the war. Taxes, oil revenues, domestic borrowing, and bank financing remain.

Taxes and other regular payments from the extraction and sale of oil and gas that go into Russia’s federal budget.

In June 2026, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy called revenues from commodity exports a “decisive variable” for the Russian economy, and said that after financial reserves declined, Russia’s capacity to wage war became even more dependent on hydrocarbon exports.

Oil and gas revenues already show up, in part, in the budget deficit, but they are worth tracking on their own: this indicator is updated faster. A budget deficit can be disguised. Oil and gas revenues are harder to disguise. They also affect the ruble’s exchange rate and the balance of payments.

↑ 7 One of the key sources of revenue for the Russian budget. In 2025, oil and gas revenues were about a quarter of budget receipts, and the 2026 budget puts the share at about 22%. When they fall, the deficit and the need to borrow rise sharply. Russia can offset part of the loss by borrowing, raising taxes, and cutting other spending.

The gap between federal spending and federal revenue, accumulated since the start of the current year. When spending exceeds revenue, that gap is the deficit.

The indicator shows whether Russia’s current revenue is enough. The larger the deficit, the more the government has to borrow, draw from reserves, or raise through higher taxes, and so the economic cost of the war gradually rises. We gave this indicator the heaviest weight on our 10-point scale, because it shows whether Russia has the money to keep fighting. Tricks are available, including taking money from regional budgets or from bank revenues. When there is no money in the budget, the tricks do not help.

↓ 10 The larger the budget deficit, the more Russia has to borrow, spend down reserves, or raise taxes in order to keep military spending high.

These are foreign currency, gold, and other external assets, mostly at the Central Bank’s disposal. They are the country’s financial backstop in a crisis, when external payments run into trouble, or when the currency market is disrupted.

Large reserves that can actually be used help Russia absorb sanctions and external shocks and keep the financial system stable. They are not budget money that can simply be spent on the war, and a large share of Russia’s currency reserves is frozen in the West.

↑ 4 This is a noticeable margin of safety for the Russian economy. For financing the war as it goes on, it matters less than oil and gas revenues, tax receipts, the room to borrow at home, or the liquid part of the NWF.

How much consumer prices have risen compared with the same month a year earlier. In August 2026, prices were about 6% higher than in August 2025.

High inflation affects the ability to wage war. It makes goods and production more expensive, raises labor costs, eats away at the money in the budget, and forces the Central Bank to keep rates high, which slows the economy further.

↓ 4 High inflation demoralizes people and drives them into poverty. Inflationary financing of the war, together with the blockade, undermined Germany’s economy and morale on the home front, and was one of the factors in its defeat in the First World War. Inflation in Russia is low at the moment, in no small part because the Central Bank’s rate is high.

How expensive it is for banks, businesses, citizens, and the state to borrow depends in large part on the Central Bank’s benchmark rate. In September 2026, the regulator left it at 14%. The Central Bank’s rate is tightly linked to inflation. The two are elements of one phenomenon: a war economy that is overheating.

↓ 6 A high rate hits the civilian economy harder. Defense plants are partly shielded from the high cost of money by state subsidies, preferential loans, and financing from state banks.

The debt burden on the economy as a whole: how much the state, Russian companies, and households owe, taken together, on loans and other debt.

This matters because a heavy debt load, combined with high rates, forces the state, businesses, and households to spend more and more servicing old debts. Less is left for investment, production, and new borrowing.

↓ 2 A large debt does not, by itself, stop a country from waging war. But when the debts are too large, any shock — a sudden, sharp drop in the price of some important commodity, or a rise in rates — can set off a chain of bankruptcies, one failure pulling down the next. That is how several of the biggest financial crises in the world began, including the crisis of 2008.

How many hours of air-raid alert all Russian regions have accumulated together over a given period. If ten regions are under alert for one hour at the same time, the indicator reads 10 hours.

↓ 3 Long and frequent alerts matter here because they show the public and the elites that the war is going on, including on Russian territory. They are also a blow to imperial arrogance.

This shows the depth of Ukrainian strikes. Hits make military production harder, to some extent. Hits on oil and gas infrastructure show up in the oil and gas revenue figure. As with the duration of alerts, the main effect is psychological.

↓ 3 A wider geography of attacks also has some military effect. Russia has to move air-defense systems deeper into the country, the defense is stretched, and more openings appear for Ukrainian strikes near the front. The number of regions under alert is not the number of successful strikes.

The figure, based on estimates by the Ukrainian General Staff, shows how many Russian servicemen are put out of action in a day, killed or wounded. About 140 million people live in Russia. Human life is not valued there, and society does not want to see a problem in its enormous losses. But every person killed is tax revenue the state never receives, and payments to his family.

How the area of Ukraine under Russian control changes from day to day. A positive number means Russia is taking territory. A negative number means it is losing territory. The series is built on DeepState data.

The figures show whether the Russian army can turn people, equipment, ammunition, and money into a result on the battlefield.

↑ 5 A fast advance usually stirs enthusiasm in the army and on the home front, and sways foreign leaders toward whoever is succeeding. A retreat does the exact opposite, and multiplies the effect of military trouble. The front is stuck now. That gives grounds for criticism of the Kremlin’s ability to wage war, undercuts its support at home, sows doubts among the elites about whether Putin is up to the job, and reduces Russia’s power abroad. Potential allies, and Trump himself, can see that the Russian army is not up to the task.

Internet traffic from Russia, as measured by Cloudflare, shows how the volume of data passing through Cloudflare’s global network from Russian IP addresses is changing. It is a sample of the traffic the company’s infrastructure can see.

To counter Ukrainian air attacks, Russia at one point switched the internet off. That produced a wave of anger and outrage. Unfortunately, such shutdowns have since fallen off sharply.

The share of Russians polled who approve of Vladimir Putin’s performance as president.

High public approval of what Putin does can make it easier for the Kremlin to keep the war going. Under an authoritarian regime, though, poll results do not fully reflect real support, and they are not a direct measure of Russia’s ability to wage war. As Russian history shows, when most of the population starts to think that “the tsar is not the real one,” uprisings follow.

How often, and how intensely, Russian war correspondents spend the day criticizing the military leadership at various levels in their Telegram channels. The indicator shows the level of tension inside the Russian army.

How often, and how intensely, users of regional Telegram channels in Russia write about everyday life getting worse: prices, security, incomes, utilities, transport, communications, and so on.

Public opinion has never been decisive for the Russian authorities. Even so, they try to keep discontent from growing too much. The toolkit is wide: propaganda at home, real handouts or some easing of the pressure, work aimed at particular groups, intimidation, and repression.