Журналістика даних
How Russian disinformation penetrates and takes root in the Czech information space
Every country that consistently supports Ukraine is a target for Russian information operations. The Czech Republic is no exception. Russia uses low-tier news sites and mass comments on social media to shift public opinion and minimize support for Ukraine, as well as to deepen internal social divisions and Euroscepticism. The Kremlin operates not as a sprinter, but as a marathon runner. It does not expect an immediate effect — its strategy relies on repeatedly spreading the desired narratives and slowly eroding trust in mainstream media and level-headed politicians.
Key findings from the study:
- Russia systematically influences the Czech information space through a network of proxy sites. We examined over 165,000 posts from 21 Czech websites that disseminate propaganda, destructive, or conspiracy theory content, analyzed over 22,000 YouTube videos, and reviewed more than 1.8 million comments.
- 66% of the posts on these online media outlets contained at least one propaganda narrative. A total of 55 such narratives were identified across seven thematic groups: the war in Ukraine, Russia, the United States, Europe, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and international events. The total monthly traffic to these sites was 10.18 million.
- The most persistent narratives concern Russia’s inevitable victory and the ineffectiveness of aid to Ukraine ("Ukraine is losing the war" — 28,095 posts), Trump as a peacemaker who is exploiting Ukraine and peace talks for his own benefit ("Trump’s peace strategy" — 17,344), and about Europe dragging out and provoking a war against Russia ("The EU and Britain are prolonging the war in Ukraine" — 12,404).
- The Czech low-tier publications analyzed draw their information directly from Russian sources, including RT, TASS, RIA, and the social media accounts of well-known propagandists. This is the main channel through which propaganda enters the Czech information space, and it indicates the structural integration of Czech “alternative media” into the broader Russian information infrastructure.
- Comments on relevant YouTube videos are an important tool for promoting Russian narratives. The study identified more than 2,700 users who post comments simultaneously in both the Czech and Ukrainian segments of YouTube. Of these, at least 570 behave like bots or internet trolls. In particular, the study documented repeated use of identical phrases in comments.
Disinformation works like poison. Its effects are often imperceptible at first, but if an antidote isn’t found in time, the consequences can be irreversible. This poison penetrates most quickly through existing cracks in society: internal conflicts, political polarization, dissatisfaction with the government or EU leadership, economic anxiety, or cultural irritation stemming from liberal changes.
Pro-Russian political forces spread this toxin, news outlets directly or indirectly linked to Russia, as well as networks of sympathizers and opportunistic allies — ranging from online media to social media platforms.
In this investigation, we focused on two key channels for spreading such influence: low-tier Czech online media and YouTube, where information warfare is often disguised as ordinary public discourse.
We compiled a sample of 21 Czech-language online media outlets that promote conspiracy theories and disinformation. According to SimilarWeb, the total traffic to these sites in April exceeded 10 million. (It is important to understand that 10 million visits does not mean 10 million readers: one person can visit a site dozens of times, and each such visit is counted separately.)
We selected 26 Czech YouTube channels covering a broad spectrum of Czech public discourse: public media, independent online media, influential content creators and podcasters, far-right and conspiracy theory channels, as well as YouTube channels run by political parties and public figures. In total, we analyzed 22,283 videos and over 1.8 million comments.
Study period: February 2025-February 2026.
Websites
The articles were collected through a search using 50 keywords in Czech. They covered topics such as the war in Ukraine, rhetoric regarding the EU, migration, and other key themes of FIMI discourse (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference).
Each website had at least 100 articles on the aforementioned topics. In total, we collected 167,941 articles.
The publication texts were divided into paragraphs and grouped by topic (clustered) using the BERTopic topic modeling model with multilingual sentence transformers. Each cluster was manually assigned a category (broad topic) and a narrative (specific message).
Topics unrelated to Ukraine and politics were excluded from the analysis. In total, 55 narratives were identified across seven thematic groups: the war in Ukraine, Ukraine, Russia, the United States, Europe, the Czech Republic, and international events.
We also collected all external hyperlinks from the websites’ articles and kept only those that were linked to more than five times. We classified the target domains into the following categories: Ukrainian media, Russian media, Russian social networks, Czech media, Czech junk websites, and others. This allowed us to assess which sources the media outlets under study rely on and the extent to which they are integrated into the Russian information ecosystem.
YouTube
We also clustered the video titles and descriptions using BERTopic. Clusters that did not contain a clear thematic signal were excluded. As a result, we identified 21 key topics.
A brief overview of narratives
One of the main objectives of this study is to trace how disinformation narratives have evolved in the Czech information space. In this context, several important conclusions can be drawn.
Firstly, pro-Russian propaganda is characterized by continuity and consistency. It is not a series of random information attacks but a systematic, long-term process of filling the information environment with narratives that serve the Kremlin’s interests.
Secondly, its strategy largely replicates the very same narratives that Russia promotes in its own information space and in other countries. In this sense, the Czech Republic is no exception, but rather another front in a global information campaign.
Alongside Russia’s global messaging, there is also a separate level of local adaptation. Some of the narratives are specifically tailored to the Czech context: history, domestic political conflicts, economic fears, and social anxieties.
Regarding the Russian narrative. On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 47th President of the United States. For Russian propaganda, this was a long-awaited celebration, the culmination of a months-long media campaign in which Trump was portrayed as a messiah who would put an end to the West’s "anti-Russian course". Similar sentiments prevailed on problematic Czech websites as well.
And when Trump failed to meet Russian expectations, was unable to pressure Ukraine fully, or openly criticized Russia, Russian propaganda would shift its narrative, and the US president would be portrayed in a negative light. This pattern was echoed in Czech proxy networks.
For example, in July 2025, the media reported that Russian state propaganda had been ordered to attack Trump following his criticism of Putin. We identified criticism of Donald Trump as one of the top topics on the Czech websites we analyzed. This once again demonstrates that we are not dealing with independent voices but rather with a network of repeaters who quickly adjust their tone in response to changes at the top.
If we were to categorize the narratives spread by Czech low-tier media websites, we could identify several main groups.
Russian metanarratives — broad strategic messages about the "decline of the West", "Russia’s inevitable victory", and "the futility of supporting Ukraine".
Anti-EU metanarratives — discrediting the European Union and NATO, fueling Euroscepticism, and creating an image of Brussels as an entity that allegedly imposes the will of others.
Local Czech narratives tap into society’s internal fears: concerns about security, the economic future, the quality of education, healthcare, and the labor market. The topics of migration, Islamic radicalism, and terrorism are particularly heavily exploited here.
Anti-Ukrainian metanarratives constitute a distinct and extremely important category: claims of a "coup" in Ukraine during the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, calls to "force Ukraine to make peace at any cost", stories about "ungrateful Ukrainian refugees" who allegedly make life worse for Europeans, or the portrayal of Ukraine as a "black hole" into which European taxpayers’ money disappears unchecked.
The most dangerous aspect of this system is that such narratives do not always resemble overt propaganda. They take root in public discourse, intertwine with real social problems (the rising cost of living, concerns about defense spending, uncertainty about the future), and gradually come to be perceived as "normal".
Hover your cursor over the rectangles in the graph to see the number of publications.
What were the most common topics?
The 10 most common narratives each month, ranked by number of paragraphs
Кількість згадок у новинах.
Ukraine may cease to exist as a state
Ukraine will never become a member of NATO and will have to come to terms with territorial losses
Europeans' private savings will be used to fund the war
The diplomacy of EU leaders is hindering a swift end to the armed conflict
Now it's the world of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump
Trump understands Putin and sees that Russia wants peace
"Ukraine is losing the war"
The most persistent and widespread pro-Russian narrative during the period under study remained the idea of Russia’s inevitable victory in the war (we called it "Ukraine is losing the war").
In the military context, this narrative was built on the constant portrayal of a Russian offensive. Reports systematically claimed that the Russian army was "encircling Ukrainian forces", "advancing on all fronts", and "methodically eliminating Ukrainian units". Any local skirmishes were presented as evidence of Moscow’s strategic superiority, and the offensive itself was portrayed as a continuous and irreversible process.
Another important element is demonstrating Russia’s technological superiority. In this context, the mention of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile served not only a military but also a symbolic purpose: it was meant to prove that Russia retains the strategic initiative and the ability to dictate the rules of the game, surprising and intimidating its adversary.
At the same time, an image of a weak Ukraine was being constructed. The Ukrainian military leadership was portrayed as incompetent, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a leader out of touch with reality who did not understand what was happening in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and was systematically lied to by those around him.
On the foreign policy front, this narrative was supplemented by claims about Ukraine’s strategic dead end: it would allegedly never become a member of NATO. It would have to come to terms with territorial losses. If the war continued, Russia might go further: seize Odesa, cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea, and turn it into a "non-functional landlocked state".
The narrative that Western aid is futile is being strongly emphasized.
According to Russian sources, Europe is supplying Ukraine with "defective" weapons that do not alter the balance of power but only prolong the suffering.
This metanarrative is aimed primarily at Western audiences, including Czech society. Its main goal is not to convince people that Russia has already won, but to sow doubt about the wisdom of continuing to support Ukraine.
To a Western audience, the message goes like this: Ukraine is unable to change the course of the war, its resources are running out, its army is growing weaker, and aid from the West is only delaying the inevitable. According to this logic, any new arms supplies and financial support appear not as an investment in security but as a waste of resources: aid to Ukraine depletes the Czech Republic’s resources, causes economic harm to ordinary citizens, and risks dragging the country into the war.
Separately, the message capitalizes on political fatigue in Western societies. The longer the war lasts, the easier it is to promote the idea that "it’s time to negotiate", even if the price of such negotiations is forcing Ukraine to make territorial concessions. In this way, the Kremlin is trying to shift the focus of the discussion from "how to help Ukraine win" to "how to end the war more quickly".
"The EU and Britain are prolonging the war in Ukraine"
This is one of the key narratives that has gained traction amid the United States’ diminishing support for Kyiv. Whereas Washington and NATO were previously viewed as the greatest enemies from the Kremlin’s perspective, Brussels and London are now increasingly being cast as the main "beneficiaries of the war". According to this logic, it is precisely these entities that are preventing Ukraine from "stopping the bloodshed". They are pushing it to continue the war, blocking negotiations, arming and financing it, and even preparing to send their own troops.
Russia positions itself as a party that is "ready for peace", while the EU is portrayed as an aggressive, militarized actor obsessed with the idea of Moscow’s strategic defeat.
In this narrative, Ursula von der Leyen is allegedly "taking Europeans’ private savings to fund the war", Emmanuel Macron dreams of "peacekeepers" who will contain Russia, and the European summits in Paris and London are portrayed as clubs of conspirators who are continuing the proxy war at any cost.
This technique is known as "projection". The aggressor blames others for their own actions. Russia, which invaded Ukraine, accuses Europe of "prolonging the war". The state that is systematically destroying Ukrainian cities speaks of a "war party" in Brussels. This allows the Kremlin to simultaneously justify its own aggression and sow division among Western audiences.
The real goal of spreading this narrative isn’t to convince everyone that Russia is right. It’s enough to sow doubt: what if this really is someone else’s war? What if Europe has gotten too carried away? If this idea takes root, support for Ukraine begins to be perceived not as the defense of the international order and normal European life, but as an expensive whim of the elites. And that is precisely when the propaganda achieves its goal — it turns fatigue into a political resource.
"Trump’s "peace" strategy"
A post from a group tentatively titled Trump’s "peace" strategy is a clear example of how pro-Russian propaganda has adapted to the new American political reality. This topic became one of the dominant ones for many months.
The main idea: Donald Trump is the only Western leader who supposedly "sees reality" and is ready to end the war because he prioritizes the interests of the US over ideology. The war ceases to be a "common Western cause" and becomes an American political issue.
Trump is a pragmatist. He "immediately launches negotiations", "talks directly with Vladimir Putin", "stops the slide toward World War III", and refuses to fund "someone else’s war". This is the classic image of a dealmaker — a person who isn’t seeking justice or values, but wants to reach an agreement and put an end to the chaos.
The new US president supposedly isn’t so much waging war or conducting peace negotiations as he is reviewing America’s "portfolio of assets". And Ukraine appears in it not as an ally, but as a resource-rich territory with limited political value.
The narrative of "rational Trump versus the irrational status quo" is being promoted. Any statements he makes about the need to end the war quickly, shift the financial burden to Europe, or criticize previous US policy are interpreted as signs of strategic foresight. In contrast, previous Western policy is portrayed as emotional, costly, and dangerous — one that allegedly pushes the world toward escalation.
In this narrative, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European leaders are portrayed as antagonists. Zelenskyy is depicted here as an obstacle to peace — a man who "refuses to sit down at the negotiating table", demands more money and weapons, avoids elections, and lives off American taxpayers. Europe, meanwhile, is portrayed as weak but belligerent — unable to act on its own, yet ready to drag out the conflict "until the last Ukrainian".
A separate layer of this narrative is the normalization of direct dialogue between the US and Russia as a "restoration of a healthy international order". Sanctions, military support, and multilateral formats are presented as deviations, while negotiations between major powers are portrayed as a return to "realistic diplomacy". That is precisely why any signs of contact between American and Russian officials are cited as evidence of progress, even if the substance of those contacts remains unclear.
You can view the list of common narratives here.
Czech junk websites
According to Similarweb, the total monthly audience for the 21 websites we analyzed is 10.18 million visitors (if a person visited the site multiple times during the day or returned after more than 30 minutes of inactivity, this is counted as a new visit).
To understand exactly which propaganda and destructive narratives are most prevalent and how they infiltrate the Czech information space, we first focused on so-called junk sites.
By this term, we mean media outlets that position themselves as an alternative or opposition to so-called mainstream media but, at the same time, do not adhere to basic journalistic standards. Precisely for this reason, they often become a tool for spreading unverified claims, content where opinions take precedence over facts, and narratives linked to harmful external influence.
Another, equally apt description for such resources is a stable network of proxy sites. These are disinformation channels that constantly flood the Czech information space with toxic content. Their sheer volume and persistence represent one of the Czech Republic’s key vulnerabilities.
Resources such as neČT24 and the Pravda network are involved in large-scale "content laundering": disinformation passes through dozens of platforms, changes form, is localized, and eventually comes to resemble an organic part of the domestic public discourse. Coordinated social media campaigns amplify this effect, helping narratives from these sites infiltrate public debates.
Why is this system so resilient?
The first factor is adaptation to sanctions. After the EU restricted the operations of major Russian propaganda channels such as RT and Sputnik, Moscow did not halt its information offensive — it simply changed its strategy. Today, networks of proxy sites serve as relays for Russian state propaganda in Europe.
The second factor is disguising the content as local. The narratives are packaged around topics familiar to the Czech audience: domestic politics, economic difficulties, migration, and cultural conflicts. Added to this are local "experts", fringe politicians, public commentators, or simply seemingly random "representatives of the people" — internal amplifiers that create the illusion of authenticity.
The main rule here is simple: the message can be anything, as long as it aligns with the overall logic of pro-Russian propaganda.
In both cases, the strategic goal is the same: to infiltrate disinformation into the mainstream political discourse in the Czech Republic.
The third factor is the amplification effect. Any propaganda is far more effective when voiced not by its authors but by "independent" voices. Russia needs amplifiers: hired figures, useful idiots, ideological allies, and high-profile local commentators.
If the Russian audience needs to be convinced that Europe is supposedly on the brink of collapse, the best evidence will come not from a Russian TV channel, but from a "European source". That is precisely why headlines like "European media report that migrants are undermining Czech identity" appear. On the surface, this sounds like a European perspective. However, the sources behind such headlines are, in fact, Russian.
The goal of these campaigns is clear: to undermine trust in state institutions, weaken the Czech Republic’s support for Ukraine and public support for cooperation with the EU and NATO, and intensify polarization around the most sensitive issues: migration, defense spending, and the rising cost of living.
There is another category — the so-called "Russia sympathizers". They do not necessarily have direct ties to Moscow, but they share part of its worldview: anti-Western sentiments, skepticism toward liberal democracy, and fear of globalization. That is precisely why they become effective — and often sincere — vectors of manipulative content.
Some participants in this "ecosystem" act out of their own political motives. For some websites, the main incentive may be clickbait, which allows them to make money with minimal effort. Polarization sells well, and disinformation has long been a business model.
However, our study confirms that Russia is, for the most part, the main coordinator of efforts to reshape the Czech information landscape.
A significant portion of the content comes from major Russian state-run media outlets: TASS, RIA, and Lenta.ru. Often, this is a direct copy-and-paste with machine translation. Additional sources include the Russian social media platforms Telegram, VK, and MAX, from which posts are automatically reposted as real "news".
The reach of such cases ranges from several thousand to several million views. But the main threat lies not in individual viral posts, but in the structural effect. The consolidation of narratives, the resilience of this ecosystem, the deliberate creation of new "lines of division" in society, and the slow but systematic erosion of trust in democratic institutions.
Dissemination nodes
For this study, we downloaded 381,903 links contained in articles from 21 Czech websites published between February 2025 and February 2026.
To identify the resources that Czech websites consistently link to, we selected instances where a single publication cited a specific source at least five times. This allowed us to filter out isolated mentions and retain the consistent, recurring connections between websites and specific sources. The graph shows which sources form the core of the information ecosystem of the analyzed resources.
Who is being referred to?
Website origin
Click on the website name to see the links. The larger the font size, the more links there were.
List of analyzed websites
Ranking by the percentage of news articles that promoted propaganda narratives
Data: articles published from February 2025 to February 2026
We also calculated which Russian and pro-Russian sources the analyzed Czech websites linked to most frequently. For this analysis, we excluded social media, messaging apps, and content platforms.
After filtering, 11,220 links to 259 Russian and pro-Russian websites remained. This demonstrates that the analyzed Czech resources systematically relay the Kremlin’s propaganda infrastructure — from state-run outlets (RT, TASS, RIA Novosti) to a network of "alternative" projects (Rusvesna, InfoBRICS, Anti-Spiegel, Strana).
Russian and pro-Russian sources most frequently cited by the Czech media were analyzed
Referring domain
Number of links
Target domain
Data: posts from 21 Czech-language websites from February 2025 to February 2026
These include state-run propaganda outlets such as Russia Today, RIA Novosti, and TASS. The websites Rusvesna and Strategic Culture Foundation have soviet domains.
The first one states that this media outlet was founded in March 2014 amid a wave of historic events for the "Russian world" and that its authors are participants in the "events" in Donbas, Crimea, and Syria. The second page contains information stating that they were banned from Facebook and YouTube, allegedly due to unfounded claims of ties to Russian intelligence agencies and interference in the US presidential election.
Also at the top is anti-spiegel.ru. The website states that it was created out of disappointment with the original German publication Der Spiegel, noting that the media outlet "downplays US war crimes and joyfully welcomes every war waged in the name of Western values".
The site names its author as Thomas Reper, a German who has lived in Russia for over 15 years and currently resides in a new home in St. Petersburg. In 2025, he was added to the EU sanctions list for spreading disinformation about Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Also among the top sources are Voennoye Obozreniye, Reporter, and Ukraina.ru. Some of these sources are Russian state-run or openly propagandistic media outlets. In contrast, others are formally independent pro-Russian or anti-Western platforms that systematically spread narratives favorable to the Kremlin. Here are a few of their news items cited by Czech outlets.
The first example is an RT article from late August 2025 about the assassination of former Verkhovna Rada speaker Andriy Parubiy, which Czech websites cited six times. The article claimed that Parubiy "helped ignite a civil war that ultimately led to the conflict in Ukraine".
The Czech websites aeronet.news, infokuryr.cz, novarepublika.cz, and pravyprostor.net published a news story with nearly identical text. They also added their own so-called "exclusive information from a Ukrainian correspondent", which is rife with conspiracy theories and Russian narratives.
According to this "information", Parubiy’s murder was ordered by the Ukrainian leadership.
Another hot topic at the time was the talks between Putin and Trump in Alaska. Czech media outlets were promoting conspiracy theories claiming that the Americans had allegedly agreed to hand over to Russia "more than 150 Ukrainians who had participated in crimes against the Russian population since 2014", including Andriy Parubiy.
A second example is an article from Anti-Spiegel dated February 4, 2025, titled "How will all foreign agents survive after USAID is shut down?", in which Thomas Reper claimed that after USAID funding was suspended, "all Ukrainian media outlets panicked because they survive solely thanks to it", and since "media with differing views are banned in Ukraine, only USAID-funded media exist there".
This text appeared on infokuryr.cz on February 5. "Thomas Reper: How will all foreign agents survive after USAID is shut down?" The Czech website published the reprint without any comments, clarifications, or indications of who the original author was. They took a text by a propagandist living in St. Petersburg who is on the EU sanctions list and presented it to the Czech audience as an analytical column by a "German expert".
Such cases are not uncommon: infokuryr.cz has systematically republished Reper’s work. In our sample, there are over 200 articles whose headlines begin with the words "Thomas Reper: …", in which this supposedly well-known expert writes about the CIA, BRICS, the energy sector in Estonia, Kaja Kallas, and so on. These articles were also shared by other Czech media outlets that we investigated.
Another example is an article published on the Voennoye Obozreniye website in early June 2025, in which Russian military propagandists gloated over a strike on the TCR (Territorial Center of Recruitment) building in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast, adding that "the Ukrainians might even say thank you" for this strike.
On June 5, the Czech website czechfreepress.cz cited this article. They published it under the heading "Frontline news" and retained the Russian version’s claim about "a strike on targets for which many Ukrainians may thank the Russian army". The Czech article contains no information from Ukrainian sources regarding the consequences of the strike. The authors repeat the Russian narrative about resistance to mobilization.
We also calculated the proportion of links to Russian and pro-Russian sources on the Czech websites we analyzed. For this calculation, we excluded self-citations, links between the websites under study, links to social media and messaging apps, and technical share buttons. On 12 out of 21 websites, more than 5% of such links lead to Russian or pro-Russian sites, and on some, as many as one in four or even one in three.
Czech websites that contain more than 5% of links to Russian or pro-Russian sources
Number of links to web resources on Czech websites
Number of external links in the sample
Percentage of Russian links
Data: articles published from February 2025 to February 2026
We also investigated which Russian or pro-Russian Telegram channels were most frequently cited by the Czech websites we analyzed. These included the Russian state news agencies and news channels already mentioned, as well as the social media pages of Russian military correspondents.
Russian military correspondents is a general term for a specific type of Russian propagandist. They have become an alternative source of information about the war in Ukraine for the Russian audience, complementing the official Russian state media and filling the niche of radical war commentators. Channels referenced by Czech websites include Rybar, RVvoenkor, Svodki, and Two Majors. All of them promote hostile propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation.
Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels are most frequently cited by the Czech websites analyzed
Number of links to the Telegram channel on Czech websites
Data: articles published from February 2025 to February 2026
Czech destructive websites also link to Telegram channels that are in Czech. In addition to the pages of the media outlets analyzed, links were also provided to Selský Rozum, To je náš svět, Maršál Malinovskij, InfoDefenseCZE, CZ24.NEWS, Martha Scholler.
Links to Telegram clearly dominate among links to other social media platforms. In total, 84,370 links lead to its ecosystem (including content on telegra.ph), compared to 16,297 on Twitter/X, 3,929 on Facebook, 3,211 on YouTube, and 73 on Instagram.
On Twitter/X, the accounts most frequently referenced are Rapid Response 47 (451 times) and Shadow of Ezra (344 times). On YouTube, among the identified sources, the junk news channel Protiproud TV stands out, as do the channels Spolek Svobodné rádio and Petr Bureš. On Facebook, the top link is the page of Jindřich Rajchl, the leader of the PRO political party, who spreads disinformation about Ukraine (195 links).
In addition, we examined how often the websites under study link to one another. Among all the links collected, we found 14,558 links between these same resources (excluding self-citations). To highlight stable connections, we included only pairs in the graph where one site linked to the other at least 50 times — there were 30 such pairs. This may indicate coordinated activity within a network of resources designed to reinforce specific narratives.
Russian and pro-Russian Telegram channels are most frequently cited by the Czech websites analyzed
Number of backlinks to the domain (total for 21 Czech websites)
Data: articles published from February 2025 to February 2026
In the dataset, we also found 3,931 links to Ukrainian sources in 1,770 articles.
Ukrainian sources most frequently cited by the Czech media analyzed
Number of links to Ukrainian media on Czech websites
Data: articles published from February 2025 to February 2026
Among the top five, we see the nationwide Ukrainian medias UNIAN, Ukrainska Pravda, and Censor.NET, as well as the English-language Ukrainian medias The Kyiv Independent and Kyiv Post. Citing reputable Ukrainian media outlets could be seen as a sign of a commitment to objectivity. However, they are primarily used to legitimize disinformation narratives.
It should be noted that not all Ukrainian media outlets listed in the chart above adhere to journalistic standards. For example, the UNIAN website is often criticized for clickbait and hidden advertising.
References to Ukrainian media serve as "confirmation" for fabricated or distorted claims. Readers see a link to a real Ukrainian news source and perceive it as proof of credibility. At the same time, the article being referenced may contain incorrect information or present it in a different context than the Czech source does.
As an example, consider the article "Russia has increased its combat destructive capabilities by 42% in just one year!", published on February 4, 2025, on six Czech websites we examined.
The author of the article writes that, according to his calculations, 176,000 Ukrainian soldiers have allegedly been killed since the start of the war, which is "twice as many as Western estimates and four times as many as Zelenskyy’s official figures". As a source for his calculations, he cites a page tagged #military casualties from the Ukrainian regional media outlet Poltavshchyna, which published weekly news reports on military personnel from the Poltava Oblast who had been killed in action.
The author also cites an interview by ArmyInform with a Ukrainian Armed Forces trauma surgeon regarding injuries sustained by soldiers on the front lines. These materials do not contain the figures on the number of military casualties cited by the Czech publication.
By adding other claims without any references (for example, that Poltava has the highest level of resistance to mobilization), he uses publications in Ukrainian sources as supposedly substantial arguments to confirm the accuracy of his own formulas. In reality, however, these calculations are based purely on assumptions and lack a genuine evidence base supported by statistics.
Another common tactic is to take a minor, factual report from a reputable Ukrainian publication out of context and use it as a detail in a fictional "catastrophic" narrative.
On May 7, 2025, a text titled "Putin’s major ballistic offensive is expected in a few days" was published simultaneously on three websites from the analyzed set, in which the author paints a picture of imminent defeat.
"The Kyiv regime will have no means to repel the attack", "the missile defense has already been destroyed", "only six of the eight Patriot batteries are still operational", "missile defenses are nearly exhausted", and then, according to Russia’s plan, "daily salvos of 10–30 ballistic missiles from bases in the Bryansk Oblast and Su-34 airstrikes".
The article contains a link to an article in The Kyiv Independent stating that Ukraine’s air defense is suffering from a shortage of missiles. Most of the figures in the Czech publication are accurate and come from a Ukrainian media expert. However, the authors are not manipulating the figures themselves, but rather the way they are presented, turning the Ukrainian publication’s cautious analysis — which includes qualifiers like "if" and "possibly" — into a definitive verdict.
For example, The Kyiv Independent writes that the situation could worsen, while a Czech news outlet claims that an attack has already been planned. Or, instead of reporting on pressure on the defense, the story claims that it has already been destroyed. In addition, the article was supplemented with facts not found in the source: "summer Su-34 airstrikes", "high-explosive aerial bombs on all cities along the Dnipro", "a barrage of 300–600 missiles", and comparisons to Serbia.
There is also an important difference in the conclusions. The Ukrainian media emphasizes that Ukraine lacks air defense capabilities to protect civilians, and concludes the article by stating that a decrease in the number of interceptions means more civilian casualties. In contrast, the Czech outlet promotes a narrative favorable to Russia, arguing that resistance is futile and that delaying peace is counterproductive.
Another tactic is to use criticism from within Ukraine to discredit its leadership. On December 1, 2025, the website infokuryr.cz published an article by pro-Kremlin propagandist Andrew Korybko titled "Ukrainian anti-corruption scandal turns into a creeping coup".
The author draws on a real-life corruption scandal in Ukraine — the case of Andriy Yermak, the former head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, whose premises were searched by anti-corruption authorities as part of an investigation. The article cites a November 19, 2025, investigation by The Kyiv Independent on Yermak’s role, and this is the only reference to a Ukrainian source in the text — the rest link to RT, the Kremlin’s website, and Korybko’s own blog.
He uses real facts as "evidence" that the anti-corruption investigation is supposedly a " creeping coup" against Zelenskyy, coordinated by the US.
"Zelenskyy could be next if he fails to meet Trump’s demands. Without his éminence grise, who kept him in power, he is now more politically vulnerable than ever", the author asserts.
A telling distortion is hidden in the description of the anti-corruption agencies. The Kyiv Independent refers to NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) and SAPO (Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office) as independent institutions that Yermak tried to bring under his control, but which the public defended. At the same time, Korybko portrays them as a "US-funded instrument of regime change". There are no scenarios of a coup or Zelenskyy’s replacement by Valerie Zaluzhnyi in the source — these are the propagandist’s own fabrications, added to the fact of the search.
So what's going on on YouTube?
Another platform for spreading destructive narratives in the Czech information space is Czech YouTube channels.
From our other study, we know that Russians actively spread their disinformation on this social media platform, especially in the comments sections under videos on hot political topics.
We analyzed the main topics covered on popular Czech YouTube channels, as well as the comments under the videos.
What were the videos on Czech YouTube channels about?
Number of descriptions under the video
Data: video descriptions on 26 YouTube channels from February 2025 to February 2026
Comments under YouTube videos (and on social media in general) are not just audience reactions. In the context of propaganda, they serve a distinct and quite important function: they create the impression among viewers that everyone thinks this way, thereby reinforcing hostile, destructive narratives.
We downloaded over 1.8 million comments. We then compared user IDs from the Czech YouTube (26 channels) with those of commenters from Ukraine who left comments on the platforms of 25 popular Ukrainian news YouTube channels. We found that 2,773 commenters were active on both the Czech and Ukrainian YouTube segments. On Ukrainian YouTube, these commenters left over 57,000 comments, and on Czech YouTube, over 238,000.
They may include Ukrainian refugees, Czech citizens, and members of the Russian diaspora, but there are also pro-Russian internet trolls and bot networks among them.
We were able to identify 577 commenters whose behavior most closely resembles that of bots or trolls due to their identical posts. In other words, at least 577 accounts exhibiting inauthentic behavior are engaged in trolling or supporting bot activity in both the Czech and Ukrainian information spaces.
The pattern is often as follows: on the Czech YouTube channel, comments are written in Czech, while on the Ukrainian channel, they are written in Czech, Russian, and Ukrainian.
This isn't just Russian propaganda. There are messages of support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. At the same time, there is a significant amount of disinformation and destructive narratives.
For example, a user with the ID UCRBPrSlq3gXH4XLnbUQKXOA has repeatedly left identical comments in Czech under Czech videos stating that Ukraine must surrender ("Ukrajina musí kapitulova"). At the same time, on Ukrainian YouTube, he shares messages in Russian claiming that "Sloviansk is Russia" and "Lysychansk has been liberated" (cities in Ukraine).
A user with the ID UC_CzYzbKwni_MnlVtNsl9DQ is leaving four identical comments in Czech on Czech YouTube channels, claiming that Ukraine is part of Russia and that the Czech government should return the funds allocated to the war without the consent of Czech taxpayers. Meanwhile, under Ukrainian videos, he writes in Russian that Ukrainians do not want to fight.
Commentator
On Czech YouTube
(translated from Czech)
On Ukrainian YouTube
(translated from Russian)
@ChciMír-w8r
On Ukrainian YouTube
(translated from Russian)
@mokobuko
@miloszednik6486
Russia saved 15 million Russian Ukrainians from the terror of the Nazis from Kyiv
Supporting the regime of dictator Zelenskyy, whom Ukrainians hate, is despicable
Ukraine must surrender
Sloviansk is Russia
Unfortunately, Ukraine has always been under Russia’s influence and is one of Russia’s republics. And Russia will not let it go. Our Ukrainian-Czech "five-party coalition" government should return the money from Czech taxpayers that was sent to Ukraine without their consent
Ukrainians want and are receiving weapons from Europe. But more than 250,000 Ukrainian men between the ages of 18 and 55 are hiding in Europe and don’t want to fight for Ukraine. Wealthier men are fleeing Ukraine in exchange for bribes. Ukrainian men are not returning home to Ukraine to fight!!! And until they do, Europe should not provide financial or military aid
Thus, the analysis indicates the presence of cross-activity among commenters in the Czech and Ukrainian segments of YouTube, suggesting potentially coordinated or systematic information influence.
The identified accounts exhibit significant uniform or repetitive activity, which points to automated or semi-automated behavior patterns characteristic of bots and trolls. They serve as a tool for information influence, particularly by creating the effect of "mass opinion". Commenters often amplify the narratives we identified while researching Czech proxy sites, working to implement the core principles of propaganda: repetition and widespread dissemination.
This underscores the importance of continuing to monitor comments as a component of information security in the context of hybrid information warfare.
Recommendations
Russia actively uses disinformation as a tool of hybrid warfare. Disinformation and propaganda are among the key mechanisms for achieving the Kremlin’s political, strategic, and tactical goals.
That is precisely why European countries should constantly take this threat into account in their policies, particularly in the areas of national security, defense, and the protection of sovereignty.
Below, we propose a series of measures for all stakeholders — primarily Ukraine — that can enhance resilience to destructive information influences and operations.
It is necessary to analyze information ecosystems on an ongoing basis, strengthen monitoring of media infrastructure — especially resources that may be linked to foreign "actors" — and identify not isolated instances of disinformation, but rather coordinated information campaigns.
Modern Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) operations do not require complex technological innovations — they are based on the rebranding of banned resources and the large-scale distribution of content through social media, web platforms, bot networks, and proxy sites. These are industrialized practices available to both state and non-state "actors".
It is important to close legal and technical loopholes for Russian media and information channels subject to European sanctions. Particular attention should be paid to proxy networks, automated content distribution networks, and cross-border channels used to "launder" content.
Measures to counter proxy networks:
- regular information network mapping (who links to whom);
- investigating the funding of such resources;
- revealing the connections between resources (transparency of ownership);
- legal mechanisms to restrict the activities of media outlets that systematically violate journalistic standards.
The main challenge for democratic institutions is the gap between the speed of information attacks and the ability to respond to them. Without the swift imposition of sanctions, meaningful accountability for platforms, effective data sharing between countries, and a systematic pre-bunking mechanism, FIMI will continue to undermine the resilience of Ukraine, the EU, and NATO.
It is important to establish transparent rules for political advertising and sponsored content, introduce mandatory labeling of state-owned and politically affiliated media, and implement rapid response mechanisms to address coordinated networks of accounts, particularly through collaboration with major digital platforms.
In the area of international coordination, the following are advisable:
- exchange of information on influence networks among EU countries;
- joint sanctions lists targeting media outlets and individuals who systematically spread disinformation;
- coordination with NATO and European Centers for Countering Hybrid Threats.
It is also important to develop and promote constructive metanarratives—that is, to counteract destructive influences at the cognitive level. This requires establishing a sustainable system of strategic communication and implementing pre-bunking mechanisms on an ongoing basis.
It is also necessary to:
- institutionalize efforts to counter disinformation through unified coordination centers;
- ensure a systematic state presence in information environments where audiences are formed (YouTube, social media);
- shift from a reactive model (debunking fake news) to a proactive one (being the first to explain);
- build trust through regular, transparent, and predictable communication.
In addition, it is important to raise awareness among policymakers, journalists, and civil society about the techniques and scale of Russian disinformation operations.
Also, we should hold institutions and individuals who deliberately spread destructive disinformation more accountable.
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On Czech YouTube
(translated from Czech)