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Elections overshadowed by Kyiv: Ukraine as the centerpiece of Orbán's campaign
Parliamentary elections will take place in Hungary on April 12. The election campaign has been extremely heated. Viktor Orbán, who risks losing the election, has staked his campaign on anti-Ukrainian sentiment. Consequently, his campaign and the media under his control are constantly leveling accusations against Ukraine. We analyzed the content of the main pro-government media outlets and identified the key themes they have been promoting regarding Ukraine and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Describing the election campaign in jest, Hungarians appear to be choosing between Orban and Zelenskyy, since a significant portion of the pro-Orbán campaigning centers on the President of Ukraine.
Orban’s propaganda machine is using a classic strategy: create an external enemy (this role assigned to Ukraine), turn it into an internal threat, and cast Viktor Orbán as the savior of Hungarians and Europe.
Texty.org.ua and the SPRAVDI Center for Strategic Communications conducted a joint investigation to determine how anti-Ukrainian narratives are being used during the parliamentary election campaign in Hungary. The results were revealing: Hungarian government propaganda is actively playing the "Ukrainian card", replicating familiar Russian disinformation tactics: fakes, hype, and distortion of facts.
For this study, we analyzed content published on Hungarian websites between January 1 and March 11, 2026. Specifically, these were the pro-government media outlets: origo.hu, magyarnemzet.hu, hirado.hu, and mandiner.hu. First, we downloaded news headlines referencing Ukraine from the GDELT Global Knowledge Graph database using the keywords "Ukrajna", "Zelenszkij", and "Kijev".We then downloaded content directly from these media outlets’ websites that contained similar words in news headlines or similar tags, resulting in 4,790 news articles.
We applied the BERTopic automatic topic identification algorithm to each paragraph.
The identified topics (groups of materials with similar content) were manually analyzed for the presence of specific narratives. Our conclusions are based on this data and examples of paragraphs related to the topic.
We extracted descriptions of Zelenskyy using API requests to OpenAI’s gpt-5.1 model.
Brussels-Kyiv "conspiracy" against Budapest
The pro-government media in Hungary frequently promote the idea that the country’s main enemy is not Russia, which is waging war against Ukraine, but a very specific axis: Brussels, Kyiv, and the Hungarian opposition. All of them are allegedly acting in concert to oust Viktor Orbán and drag Hungary into the war.
This narrative consists of several disparate claims that, taken together, form a coherent, conspiracy-theory-based worldview. Particular attention is paid to Roland Tseber, a member of the Zakarpattia Regional Council, whom the Hungarian authorities expelled from the country and barred from re-entry. At the same time, they emphasize that he previously held dual citizenship of Ukraine and Hungary but renounced the latter in 2017. Stories about Tseber, along with the broader theme of election interference, have become widespread in the Hungarian media landscape.
According to Hungary’s pro-ruling Fidesz party, Roland Tseber is Zelenskyy’s official representative in Zakarpattia, and it was he who allegedly organized Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar's trip to Kyiv and his meetings with Ukrainian military officials and politicians. Incidentally, Magyar himself and his party, Tisza, are portrayed not as an independent political force, but as a tool of external powers.
Pro-government media outlets, primarily Mandiner and Origo, reported on a tax authority investigation into money laundering, hinting that the Tisza party might be involved. Propagandists claimed that the opposition had received millions of euros for the elections from Ukraine through secret channels organized by Tseber. No evidence was provided, but they attempted to create the impression that Péter Magyar was a puppet of Kyiv, financed by contraband cash and gold smuggled across the border.
No concrete evidence was cited in these publications; instead, they used vague phrasing such as "according to sources" and "according to the publication". The sources cited there are generally quite dubious. At the same time, these same media outlets quoted Máté Kocsis, who, citing intelligence agency data, claimed that Tseber was linked to Ukrainian intelligence. In reality, however, the source of this story was the Russian Telegram channel "Rybar", whose "analysis" the Hungarian side rephrased in its own way, and some independent Hungarian media outlets disseminated without verification.
Comments by Ukrainian analyst Serhii Stukanov, recorded on video, were widely circulated. He claimed that if Péter Magyar came to power, he would follow Brussels’ instructions and help Ukraine continue the armed conflict. Orbán-aligned publications presented this as an exposé, although in reality it was the opinion of a single analyst, not Ukraine’s official position.
There was also significant attention paid to a statement by Manfred Weber, leader of the European People’s Party (EPP), which Tisza aligned itself with. He said that the EPP cooperates only with parties that support Ukraine. Hungarian propaganda interpreted this as an ultimatum — Hungary is obligated to defend Ukrainian interests. In the analyzed materials, Weber is mentioned exclusively in a negative context as the "chief lobbyist" for Kyiv’s interests in Brussels. His name has become almost synonymous with external pressure on Hungary.
Hungarian propaganda generally tried in every way to leave Russia out of the picture. The argument was that the source of the "conflict" should be sought in the "Brussels-Kyiv coalition", which has an interest in the war not ending.
A separate issue was the blocked EU loan to Ukraine for 90 billion euros. Pro-government media explained the Hungarian veto not as an obstacle for Kyiv, but as protection against being dragged into endless war financing. The Viktor Orbán government conveyed this idea as follows: "If the Péter Magyars win, Hungarian money will go to the war".
Another tactic was to take Zelenskyy’s statements about Ukraine joining the EU by 2027 and present them as proof that Kyiv wants to drag Hungary into the war through EU expansion. And the idea of Ukraine’s faster accession without all the requirements is called the "Brussels trap".
Finally, pro-government media regularly suggested that if Tisza came to power, Hungarian soldiers would end up on the front lines. To support this, they cited remarks by Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, a defense expert for Tisza, stating that Hungary was not facing a threat of war. Propagandists portrayed this as an irresponsible downplaying of the danger.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy is an enemy of Hungary
Among all the foreign politicians mentioned by Hungary’s pro-government media, Zelenskyy ranks high. All these references to him share the same tone: he is not the president of a neighboring country at war with an aggressor, but a personal enemy of Hungary and its prime minister.
The central episode that Hungarian propaganda exploited most was the claim that Orbán’s home address was revealed. Pro-government media presented it this way: Zelenskyy personally threatened to hand over the Hungarian prime minister’s address to the military so they could "talk to him in his own language".
Added to this were remarks by Yevhen Karas, a major in the Ukrainian army and leader of the far-right organization C14, whom Zelenskyy had previously awarded. His statement that a Ukrainian brigade could be in Hungary in a matter of minutes if Orbán admitted to being a KGB agent became the subject of pro-government publications. Origo and Mandiner published articles under headlines about "invasion" and "Nazi threats".
Overall, the topic of "unprecedented threats" against Viktor Orbán was the subject of numerous articles, in which the Ukrainian leadership was portrayed as an aggressive force seeking to remove the Hungarian prime minister physically.
In the Hungarian media, corruption in Ukraine always has one face — Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The propaganda does not accuse the government in the abstract or individual officials, it attacks the president personally. In doing so, it uses two main narratives.
The first was the "golden toilet". According to Hungarian media reports (though Ukrainian journalists also covered the story), a gold-plated toilet was discovered in the apartment of Zelenskyy’s business partner, Timur Mindich. And alongside this "highlight", they immediately added that the President of Ukraine personally celebrated his birthday in this apartment during the pandemic. This narrative was intended to convince Hungarians that the Ukrainian leader is a typical corrupt oligarch wallowing in luxury.
The second was the "gold convoy". Propagandists began hyping a story orchestrated by the Hungarian authorities, namely the detention of Oschadbank’s (a major public bank in Ukraine) cash-in-transit vehicles, which, in accordance with interbank agreements, were transporting cash and gold bars from Austria’s Raiffeisenbank to Ukraine (before the war, such routine banking operations were carried out by plane, now they are done by ground transport).
In the election campaign, this was presented as proof of the existence of a "Ukrainian military mafia", with claims that Western financial aid is not reaching the front lines but is ending up in the pockets of Zelenskyy’s inner circle. Such attention to the incident proves once again that it was fabricated specifically to be woven into the election campaign. Incidentally, the Hungarian authorities never returned the funds, and Oschadbank considers them stolen.
Some of Zelenskyy’s persistent accusations centered on the idea that it was in his interest for the war not to end. Pro-government media outlets openly claimed that he and certain European elites remained in power solely because of the conflict, and therefore any peace initiative posed a threat to them. Zelenskyy’s statements about joining the European Union by 2027 were also framed in this context, with the claim that he does not so much want to integrate as to drag Hungary into the war through the shared defense and security obligations of EU member states. Pro-government media even coined a special term for this: the "Brussels trap".
They also tried to intimidate Hungarians with economic consequences. They claimed that local farmers would lose markets, and every family would be forced to pay over 1.3 million forints for the reconstruction of the neighboring country. The narrative about the financial burden and the figure of "800 billion" (allegedly the total bill for Hungary to cover the reconstruction) appeared in a series of publications by the media outlets we analyzed.
In each such piece, the costs were linked to Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s name as the initiator demanding this money. At the same time, they suggested that under such conditions, Hungarian soldiers would inevitably end up on the front lines. The publication Origo promoted this last argument most aggressively, drawing a direct link between financial aid to Kyiv and Hungary’s direct participation in the war.
Voices from within Ukraine also contributed to the overall "picture". The media eagerly quoted Valerii Zaluzhny’s criticism of the President’s Office over the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive and interference in operational decisions. This was presented as confirmation that even his own generals understand: Zelenskyy is leading the country into an abyss.
Against the backdrop of Zelenskyy’s oppressive image, Orbán himself is portrayed in pro-government Hungarian media as the "last defender of common sense" in Europe.
Energy blackmail
To create a starkly negative image of Ukraine, pro-government Hungarian media are constructing a narrative of "energy blackmail", which Kyiv allegedly employs to interfere in elections. Key talking points include speculation surrounding the "political blocking" of the Druzhba oil pipeline, as well as accusations that Ukraine is responsible for attacks on the infrastructure of the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines. Both are channels for supplying gas from Russia to Turkey, which then flows through TurkStream to Hungary, Slovakia, and Serbia.
The motive attributed to Ukraine and Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally is quite simple: to undermine the well-being of Hungarians (and the popularity of Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party) by provoking an energy crisis and rising prices in Hungary. And thereby help the opposition party, Tisza, led by Péter Magyar, come to power.
Pro-government media are unquestioningly broadcasting statements by government officials about Ukrainians’ unwillingness to resume gas supplies via the Druzhba pipeline and to allow foreign inspectors to inspect it.
Accusations of attacks on the infrastructure of the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines are in sync with the Russians’ information campaign: media loyal to Orbán have been spreading statements by Putin and Peskov claiming that the FSB possesses "reliable information" about preparations for sabotage. Ukraine is portrayed as a country ready to attack the energy security of EU and NATO countries to draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia.
These suspicions are further fueled by reports in the Hungarian media regarding the alleged involvement of Ukrainian intelligence in the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, which Germany is currently investigating. The sabotage of the Russian gas pipelines is being portrayed as an "act of state terrorism" and a blow to the European economy. Speculation on this topic in the Hungarian media is being used by those who advocate ending support for Ukraine (which, they claim, harms the EU’s economic interests) as further "proof" of its readiness to disrupt gas transit through Turkey as well.
The evolution of the campaign. 1. The rational phase (spring 2025) → ‘Ukraine — an economic risk’. 2. Personalisation (summer 2025) → “Zelenskyy = the Hungarian opposition”. 3. Emotional escalation (autumn 2025) → “war, fear, external threat”. 4. Dehumanisation (late 2025) → “caricatures, humiliation”. 5. Final message (2026) → “Ukraine will take your money”, “Ukraine will cheat you”. SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
Calls to vote ‘correctly’ in the 12 April election. Text on the visual on the left: ‘We won’t let Zelenskyy have the last laugh!’. A reference to the proverb ‘He who laughs last laughs best’. Visual on the right: “They are a risk; Fidesz is the safe choice.” SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
February–March 2026. SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
A photograph of a tram stop with posters, taken on 24 February 2026 against the backdrop of the Chain Bridge in Budapest, illuminated in blue and yellow as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine (an initiative by Budapest City Council). Typical slogan: ‘Message to Brussels — we will NOT pay!’. SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
December 2025. One of the most striking visuals against the backdrop of a corruption scandal in Ukraine. Zelenskyy, von der Leyen and Madyar are pouring money into a golden toilet. SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
Summer–Autumn 2025. Slogan: ‘Together for the war’. SPRAVDI Centre for Strategic Communications
Zakarpattia issue
The issues of mobilization in Ukraine and the situation of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia are increasingly being woven into Orbán’s pre-election information campaign—not as separate topics, but as parts of a cohesive narrative. In this picture, Ukraine is portrayed not merely as a country at war, but as a fundamentally problematic space where human rights violations are allegedly the norm and national minorities are victims.
This narrative is reinforced by dehumanizing language that sets the tone in the news. Ukrainian soldiers and military recruiters, called "Zelensky’s kidnappers", and the mobilization is called a "manhunt": "Zelensky’s kidnappers do not consider their fellow citizens to be human beings. During forced mobilization, recruiters treat their victims almost like animals".
Then the familiar logic takes over: isolated incidents, often without confirmation or context, are blown out of proportion to the level of the entire system. They are presented as the rule rather than the exception. Videos from social media play the role of "evidence", although their verification remains out of focus. As a result, emotion supplants analysis, and impressions take precedence over facts.
Against this backdrop, an image of Ukraine is being constructed as a state where mobilization is rife with inequality and abuse. Corruption determines who serves; the wealthy avoid the front lines, while socially vulnerable groups are "sent to their deaths": "In Ukraine, there is still a significant affluent segment of the population capable of securing protection for themselves". The best way to counter such propaganda is through changes to the mobilization system. We hope that the changes announced by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov (the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has stated that reforms are being developed, but has not yet presented them), will be able to change the situation with mobilization, so that it ceases to serve as a convenient backdrop for enemy propaganda.
Particular emphasis is placed on the stories of Hungarians in Zakarpattia, who are allegedly victims of systematic pressure: "The issue of forced mobilization is particularly acute for the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia: over the course of the year, the local community has been shaken by several fatalities". Such cases are presented through personal stories with names, families, and details of the tragedies. Over time, a generalized image emerges from them: the Hungarian minority as a victim of state policy, which gives grounds to speak of "systematic persecution": "Currently, there are eighty known Hungarian victims from Zakarpattia, among whom are those who died not at the hands of the enemy, but after a training camp".
There is another important element to this picture—the role of the EU. Brussels is portrayed in a way that bears no resemblance to reality. In reality, European officials are constantly encouraging Ukraine to fight corruption and pursue other positive changes. But Orbán’s propaganda portrays the EU as an accomplice: "While the Ukrainian government and the Brussels elite turn a blind eye to abuses, their consequences are becoming increasingly tragic". A contrast is drawn between "indifferent" Brussels and "proactive" Hungary.
In this narrative, Viktor Orbán emerges as a steadfast defender of Hungarians abroad. His policies are described as a rational and principled response to systemic violations: "Relations between the two countries were tense even before the war due to laws on minority languages and education reforms".
However, the conflict added a new dimension to the disputes. Diplomatic dialogue was interrupted on several occasions, and in 2025, negotiations on minority rights also reached an impasse. Hungary exhausted all diplomatic channels at the UN, OSCE, and EU. Kyiv did not back down and ultimately implemented regulations that violate the rights of the Hungarian minority.
To reinforce this narrative, a cultural tool is employed: Ádám Tősér’s film The Threat Nearby (Baljós közelség), which appears to be a documentary but is in fact a propaganda piece. Its promotion is accompanied by dramatic descriptions: "The documentary film The Threat Nearby takes us behind the front lines, as well as to the multinational region of Zakarpattia, known as ‘Little Switzerland’, which was destroyed by Petro Poroshenko’s nationalist policies. The hate campaign against the Hungarian and Russian minorities and language restrictions has destroyed peaceful coexistence. The people have come to hate Poroshenko so much that, as one of the protagonists of our film says, they would even elect a goat in his place".
The film serves not only as an illustration but as part of a broader media ecosystem.
At the same time, an image of Hungary is being shaped as the defender of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia and, more broadly, as a benefactor for all Ukrainians: "The Hungarian community in Zakarpattia could count on the government’s support from the very beginning", "Hungary continues to help the Ukrainian people. The average Ukrainian does not look at how his government treats Hungarians or what steps Budapest is taking in response, but has gratefully accepted Hungarian aid for four, or even twelve, years".
This image is reinforced by the motif of Kyiv’s "ingratitude" as an explanation for Budapest’s political intransigence.
The next step is a cautious broadening of the scope. Pro-government media are beginning to hint at the possibility of revising Zakarpattia’s status: "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hungary was one of the first countries to recognize Ukraine… and even did the young country a favor by not raising… the issue of Zakarpattia’s status…". Here, historical arguments serve not so much to explain as to legitimize alternative scenarios.
Ultimately, this logic extends to Hungary’s domestic politics as well. It is claimed that even Hungarians in Zakarpattia support Orbán: "Based on leaked documents from the Security Service of Ukraine, Ukrainians, from one perspective, assessed the electoral preferences of the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia and identified alarmingly high support for Orbán".This leads to the following claim about Ukraine’s alleged interference in the elections: "According to shocking documents, Kyiv is compiling lists of Hungarians in Zakarpattia, intends to invalidate 40 percent of mail-in votes, and also send Orbán’s supporters to the front", "Zelenskyy’s plan to influence the elections in Hungary has been revealed: this is how they intend to rig the elections in favor of the Tisza party".