"We had a chance to win on the battlefield and still have it." General Muzhenko on how to stop the Russians

On the Russian offensive

We must understand that war is a long process. The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has been going on for eleven years. Ukraine won the first stage of the large-scale aggression, holding back the Russians at the borders they are practically at today. The progress over these almost three years isn't so significant if we do not count the number of villages but the percentage of territory.

Nevertheless, I don't believe it's time to say that Ukraine is losing. There have been periods of success and periods of inevitable defeats. At the moment, the Russian army has the initiative. That is, it dictates the terms to us. Yes, its successes are tactical. However, several dozen of these tactical successes give the general impression of a successful advance across the territory of Ukraine. But I will repeat once again that I do not believe there is a need to put a full stop to these events.

As for the chances of winning on the battlefield, I believe we had them and still have them.

No matter how this situation looks from the outside or how someone comments on it in the domestic and foreign media. Ukraine has a chance to win. And what is our understanding of victory in confronting such a powerful enemy? I believe it is the preservation of Ukraine as a subject of international law and a sovereign state and its Armed Forces.

On the mistakes of the Ukrainian government and military leadership over the two years of war

I believe that one of the mistakes of the first invasion stage was the conduct of negotiations. When literally, in the first days, they began discussing with the Russians the conditions for completing the process, including through the possible occupation of a particular part of Ukraine, and without any guarantees at all. I think that this demonstrated the weakness of the Ukrainian position.

This happened at a time when the Russians were confused by the unexpectedly tough meeting that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ukrainian society immediately organized for them. This was a patriotic upsurge that hasn't yet been appreciated at the level of not only individuals but also entire communities. There are many examples in Chernihiv, northern Kyiv, northern Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, and southern Ukraine. The Russians didn't expect this. They hoped for brave marches, flowers and applause.

However, this didn't happen. And then they, confused, were offered to discuss the terms of the ceasefire. This very quickly gave them the impression that the Ukrainian authorities began to bend because of this aggression. By the way, it was predictable but, for some reason, unexpected. This is the first thing.

Second. First, there was a spontaneous resistance movement. The decentralization of actions, the granting of broad powers to lower-level commanders, and the non-interference of senior management in their decisions gave them the opportunity to maneuver their forces and means. This decentralized chaos and asymmetry of actions proved effective in battles. However, the decentralized command requires disciplined initiative.

Uncontrolled and incomprehensible retreat in the Luhansk region — leaving the cities of Stanytsia Luhanska and Shchastia with an undetonated bridge

This chaotic situation was perceived at the time. Later, however, it led to a certain imbalance in the system of governance and controllability of processes. For example, there was an uncontrolled and incomprehensible withdrawal in the Luhansk region — the abandonment of Stanytsia Luhanska and Shchastya with an undetonated bridge. Why did this happen? There was no such threat; there was a large barrier line (the Siverskyi Donets River) that could have held back Russian units for quite some time, but the control points were moved to the rear for tens and sometimes hundreds of kilometers. In my opinion, this wasn't dictated by the situation in all cases.

Third. At that time, there was still chaos in the mobilization system. Everyone was accepted indiscriminately. And there was a re-sorting: an electronic warfare specialist could be sent to the infantry, and an infantry specialist could be sent to a communications unit. We somehow managed to get out of this situation through internal transfers.

Some commanders imagined that human resources were inexhaustible and were superficial in planning their actions

The fact that there was a constant influx of people at the time created a problem for the future. Some commanders imagined that the human resources were inexhaustible and superficially planned their actions, not realizing that our population was limited, that there was a massive migration of people, and that there would be many unfit for service. That is, there would come a time when replenishing the army would become a problem.

Various factors influenced the spontaneous mobilization. People were recruited to fill the quantitative needs of military units. Even if this need was exceeded, these volunteers were pushed around. What did this lead to? In 2016, after the creation of the Special Operations Forces Command, a special register of specialists in shortage specialties was established. These are Special Forces soldiers, snipers, instructors at training centers, ATGM operators, and number of other critical specialties that require specific long-term training. And where did they end up? Who paid attention to this special accounting?

Losses in the first few days of the large-scale aggression amounted to about as much as in the whole of 2014

And in general, since there was information about the invasion, why did this chaos occur on such a large scale? The losses in the first few days of the large-scale aggression amounted to about the same amount as in 2014. I told the former Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff about this in front of witnesses. Then, they started to hide these statistics.

The fourth is the issue of fortifications. On my way back from Donbas at the end of March, I received information that the Russians were withdrawing their troops from near Kyiv. Colonel Oleksandr Makhachek (a competent, intelligent officer who died in Donbas on May 30, 2022, and was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine) and I brought a map with the lines that needed to be refitted and some that were rebuilt in 2015-2016 needed to be revitalized, that is, filled with troops to put them in order.

He said: "Prepare orders." — " We will attack, we won't defend." This map is still in one of the structures of the General Staff. It was about the Zaporizhzhia region and Donbas, the directions of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. I repeat that it was in March 2022.

I called one of the chiefs who was responsible for engineering support: "How many shovels do you have?" A tractor or a bulldozer is one thing, but you still need to dig because a trench saves soldiers' lives. One of the main tools of the infantry is a shovel. A small sapper shovel, a big one - it doesn't matter.

"Twenty thousand shovels will not save a half-million army"

During the ATO, some people did not understand this. There were complaints then: "Why haven't we dug trenches?" I once asked one MP who was supposedly serving then: "Should I come and dig trenches for you?"

So, this chief replied that there were shovels. "How many?" - 'Twenty thousand.' -" Twenty thousand will not save a half-million-strong army."

I believe that one of the operational miscalculations was probably the long-term holding of Bakhmut, which resulted in significant losses.

The Kharkiv operation needed to be reformatted from offensive to defensive in a timely manner. The same mistake was repeated at the beginning of the Kursk operation

Fifth. The Kharkiv offensive was successful. But because it was not reformatted from offensive to defensive in a timely manner, we also lost our offensive potential there. That is, when we reached the area east of the Black Stallion River, the entire power of the Ukrainian offensive stalled. And the Russians managed to reinforce their troops. In this situation, we needed to reach the appropriate favorable lines, gain a foothold, and send a partial strike group to other areas. This would have allowed us to maintain the initiative.

In my opinion, the same mistake was repeated in 2024 at the beginning of the Kursk operation.

In the first stage, we conducted a relatively successful and well-planned operation, which had the effect of surprise, which is very difficult to achieve today. But to what extent was the Russian leadership aware of the likely actions of Ukrainian troops in the Kursk direction? Perhaps they needed an adequate assessment, or this assessment was different from different structures. Did the Ukrainian commanders clearly understand the expected outcome of the immediate task? And the next one? Was the timing of the operation optimal?

Whatever the case, the operation was a success. But was the format of this operation chosen correctly? Was it an offensive with the task of holding or capturing some territory, or was it a raid to destroy particular objects on this territory and then withdraw? I think it would have been a great success if it was a raid.

Sixth. Another strategic mistake was the organization of the so-called counteroffensive. I believe there was an incorrect assessment of the Russians' ability to hold their positions and seize the initiative.

Excessive expectations of the counteroffensive led to euphoria and then disappointment

There were several problems, including national ones. The early information support for this counteroffensive created an opinion in Ukrainian society that it was simply necessary to launch it after a certain time, having received certain weapons from our partners, and we would go to the shore of the Azov Sea and drink coffee on the Yalta waterfront. These inflated expectations probably led to euphoria and disappointment in Ukrainian society regarding the true capabilities of the Defense Forces, and they laid the foundation for the problems that later occurred at the front. Such mistakes should be taken into account in the future.

There were also several failures in the organization of this process. For example, I was once invited to an event. They were discussing, among other things, the progress of preparations for a counteroffensive. When I heard that engineering survey was part of assault groups, I asked: "Wait a minute. How did you assess the terrain, fortification equipment, and engineering barriers in the areas chosen for the main attacks?" I found out for myself that they simply did not conduct a reconnaissance.

There is a list of mandatory measures in the preparation of any operation. This is the basis, it is laid down in the charters, starting from the lowest level and ending with the relevant doctrines and guidelines at the highest level. However, for some reason, these points were not fulfilled. The Commander-in-Chief did not go to the areas where this strategic counteroffensive would take place to see the terrain.

I have doubts whether there was even a general plan for this strategic counteroffensive

I doubt whether there was a general plan for this strategic counteroffensive. Not individual operations in certain areas but a general plan.

There are still questions about the actions of the groups that were supposed to clear the passages for our units to the enemy's front line. I asked those who led these engineering units: "How long did you conduct fire training?" — 'Well, 25-30 minutes.' — 'And how long did the engineering units operate?' -" Two and a half hours." So it turns out these units worked for two hours without any cover — hence, the losses, hence the problems.

How could we have chosen the areas where the Russians were already waiting for us? Those were their most fortified areas

The issue of choosing the directions of the counteroffensive was also a mistake. How could we have chosen the directions where the Russians were already waiting for us? Those were their most fortified areas. Most importantly, the terrain was not favorable to us, with elevation differences, the presence of appropriate barrier lines, and so on.

The General Staff should develop the strategic plan. Then, the relevant operational and strategic groups of troops have their plans for specific areas. This is the work of different levels of government. That is, there should be a whole cascade of such plans. And the general idea of this counteroffensive operation must be signed by the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief and then approved by the President of Ukraine. The Stavka justifies its decisions with orders and directives. Should there have been an order approving such a plan? Of course, there should have been. Does it exist? I don't know.

Not only in society but also in the military, there is an opinion that Russians are not capable of fighting

We have repeatedly talked about the fact that not only in society but also in the military, the opinion has been formed that Russians are not capable of fighting. There were all these talks about "chmobiks," "Chornobaivka-3," and "two or three weeks." I will return to this topic once again.

At one time, on my initiative (I was supported, and Zaluzhny gave the order, although I did not talk to him but talked to his advisor), I joined the preparation of two corps that were formed specifically to fulfill the tasks of this counteroffensive operation. When I talked to the leadership of these Corps, I was struck by the superficial attitude, especially in the 9th Corps, "if we leave, they will run away." After a short training period of just ten days, I suggested extending it for at least another twenty days. However, they did not listen to me, so I decided to step away from this process because there is no point in working if no one needs your suggestions, your comments, or your vision.

They were planning a counteroffensive with classic battalion columns, which the Armed Forces had already abandoned

So, I suggested that as one of the stages of control, we should conduct operational flights with the departments of these Corps to understand how ready they are. I was surprised by how this counteroffensive was planned: with the classic battalion columns that we had practiced at the training grounds and had already withdrawn from. This was written in the comments after the air raids so that the commanders would pay attention and perhaps change their minds about the forms and methods of using their units in the operation. Absolutely nothing was done. And in the course of the advance, our units suffered losses.

I was not the only one involved. There was a group of officers of the General Staff and teachers of the National Defense University. They also wrote relevant comments. When assessing the consequences, they were hardly taken into account.

Military incompetence, self-confident ignorance, and euphoria among officials, along with the corresponding political pressure on the military, got in the way

I will say once again what I consider to be fundamental. The organization of the offensive process with advancement and deployment at the frontiers could not be realized at that time. Military incompetence, self-confident ignorance, and euphoria of officials with the corresponding political pressure on the military and avoidance of responsibility at the strategic level of the military and political leadership stood in the way. Subsequently, some of the above was recognized by the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in his statements.

About the Kursk operation and the current state of the front

The Kursk operation is the fate of Sumy and Zaporizhzhia. If it had a slightly different form of conduct, such as a raid, then it would have been possible to enter the territory of Ukraine two or three weeks after it began, that is, around the end of August, and not expect any escalation or any powerful Russian offensive in that direction.

At that time, the Russians had no grouping, no significant forces or means in that direction. Perhaps they would have stopped moving troops from other directions, as we would have left the Kursk region.

A Russian group has been formed in the Kursk region. And if we enter the territory of Ukraine, it will follow us

And today, I don't think we should be talking about withdrawal for sure. We must hold the appropriate lines on that territory, conducting maneuverable defense. Because if we withdraw to the territory of Ukraine, we will not be able to perform it. Now, a Russian group has been formed in the Kursk region. And if we enter the territory of Ukraine, it will follow us. And this is very dangerous.

So what do we need? Transfer of hostilities to the territory of Ukraine? Sumy is immediately under threat. And we are talking not only about air strikes and shelling but also about the immediate threat of possible actions by Russian troops in that direction. And in the Kursk region, we have the ability to maneuver. It's not critical to leave half a village or two houses in order to maneuver.

Thus, with fewer forces and means, we can hold a much larger enemy group, inflicting losses on them, which is what is happening there now, and creating a problem for the Russians not only of an image nature but also demonstrating their inability to liberate the small part of the territory that is now under Ukrainian control. That is, it is a demonstration of their inability to fight along the entire front line. They have limited resources, apparently, not only in terms of equipment and ammunition but also in terms of people. That's why they brought in the North Koreans.

If we withdraw from Kursk, there may indeed be a serious threat to Sumy

The operation has achieved certain results. I believe that its main goal was not that part of the Russian forces and mobile reserves that could have been sent to the Kupiansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar directions were redeployed to Kursk. The military voiced this goal, but it is not the main one.

If we withdraw from Kursk, Sumy may be seriously threatened. And Sumy is practically the key to Kharkiv and the opening of the road to Poltava. These are precisely the areas where the terrain is favorable for offensive actions. But do the Russians have enough forces and means to conduct such deep operations? I think not.

On mobilization of the entire population and training in the army

The tactical advance (of the Russians - Ed.) creates an operational problem. And if it is happening along the entire front line, then there may already be a strategic problem if this advance is not stopped.

We need a serious conversation with society. First of all, we need to talk about the fact that unless we unite, Ukraine will become a large military camp when not only mobilization is envisaged, but perhaps also labor service and mobilization of those who are limitedly fit and can work in the defense industry and in city-forming enterprises, we will not win the war.

We are talking about the fact that everyone should help provide the troops, starting with the camouflage nets that grandmothers and women weave. But this should be done on a massive scale. Why aren't educational institutions involved?

The government should organize this. The set of tools is huge. How can they be used as efficiently as possible?

The government needs to answer the following questions. Why was conscription abolished? Why did they slow down the basic military training of the entire population under the age of 25? It will be introduced on September 1, 2025. But how is it going to be done? Is there a material base for this?

How are they going to provide a set of training activities on a national scale? How do we implement the law on mobilization, where everything is clearly spelled out? Why do we have entertainment venues open almost around the clock, which is very outrageous for soldiers and those whose relatives are fighting? This is just another line of division in society.

There are the military, their relatives, the families of the deceased, those who have been wounded and injured (there is a very serious problem with their social support and protection), and those who do not care about the war at all.

They do not understand or do not want to understand that there is a real serious threat to the existence of the state. However, We started the conversation by saying that we would not be allowed to fall to the bottom. But to what extent and with what degree of sovereignty will the country exist?

The situation is now such that there is no other option but to recruit people, including officers, from the rear and support units to man combat units. An officer who studied at a college for four years and has already served for 10-15 years has much more skills and knowledge than one who graduated from a military department of a civilian university and was drafted.

When signing the contract, the officer knew that the service involved certain inconveniences and risks, to put it mildly. Therefore, it is definitely necessary to deprive them of their ranks and, perhaps, as in the past, give them the opportunity to atone for their guilt with blood.

As for the mobilized, this is primarily a matter of basic military training

What concerns the mobilized is primarily a matter of basic military training. Because a possible lowering of the age limit will not solve the problem of mobilization. For a certain short period, two or three months, maybe, but in principle, no. Because again, there will be limited training, again there will be failure to fulfill tasks, and again, as a result of psychological and professional unpreparedness, we will lose these people either wounded or, God forbid, killed or who leave military units without permission.

Of course, it is tough to approach training individually, but we must understand that a category of people will learn practical skills in a month and be ready to perform tasks. Some will not need two months.

There are those who will not be ready even if you give them three months. Even in the training centers, such people should be weeded out and transferred to other units that should provide training based on the characteristics of the mobilized.

But there should still be basic general military training. If they had received it, then the mobilized would probably understand military service, the risks that may be involved and a desire to serve. Then there is training in a training unit. I am sure that then there would be much fewer NWOs.

The issue of psychological training should be given serious attention. If a person has not served in the army at all, and in a month and a half, he is placed in a combat unit, what kind of soldier will he be? There will be what is called psychological losses. We had no such accounting anywhere. There is no "psychological losses" column. And they are real.

About Syrsky and Zaluzhnyi

In my opinion, Syrsky is better prepared professionally than Zaluzhny. This is the first thing.

Secondly, Syrsky has much more experience in military management, process organization, and planning than Zaluzhny.

Third, Syrskyi is able to take responsibility for his plans and actions. In my opinion, Zaluzhnyi had problems with this. The approach to management, when powers were delegated to lower levels as much as possible, is not so much a transfer of authority as a desire to avoid responsibility for certain decisions.

Perhaps, the delegation of authority at the first stage of the aggression was logical and, in my opinion, correct. But in further actions, it began to play to the negative. There were manifestations of a certain atamanism.

What did Zaluzhnyi do? The commander reported to him: "I need to give you an infantry battalion." Zaluzhny said: "You have an infantry battalion." However, there are changes in the situation when it is necessary to make decisions not only for a lower commander and give him some means but also to take responsibility and somehow help this commander fulfill the task or create favorable conditions for its fulfillment.

Both Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi have leadership failures in chaotic situations and in justifying their position to politicians

Syrsky is much weaker in terms of communication. He has a limited number of people with whom he communicates. Zaluzhnyi has a big advantage here. He was constantly in public, taking selfies and giving flags, pens, and calendars. This created the impression that he was a friend to everyone, a broad-minded person, a folk hero.

However, both have failed in their ability to demonstrate leadership in chaotic situations and justify their position as military leaders and, above all, as officers to politicians. Both had the opportunity to strengthen the officer corporation but did not do so.

The commander-in-chief is obliged to intervene in problems and solve them. Zaluzhny received information from reports and summaries. I don't know if he read them all. He listened to the commanders. How objective were their reports? He did not go not only to the front line but also to training centers (I don't know of any such examples), did not communicate directly with the military who were fighting, with instructors (by the way, we have another problem with instructors), with those who were drafted and who are about to go to the front.

And this delegation of authority to the grassroots, in my opinion, is an element of self-insurance and self-removal from decision-making.

And Syrsky, on the contrary, is at the front. But it turns out that he does not cover the entire front, but a certain part, where he is directly located and from where he controls this process. Perhaps this also has some influence on the decisions of his subordinates in these respective areas. What about the rear? How is the preparation process going? How is the planning for the next operations carried out? Is it being carried out at all? And how is the plan for the next campaign being worked out, for example?

On the failure of personnel policy

The stability of personnel (length of service, experience, level of education) determines the stability and capabilities of a unit. This is one of the main criteria for its combat capability and its governing body.

And we have failed in this regard. Since 2019, there have been three major waves of management changes without explanation. In the second half of 2019 and 2020, according to very rough estimates, about 30 generals and about 100 colonels were dismissed. Then Khomchak was replaced by Zaluzhnyi. Again, there are dismissals and changes in leadership, which is dozens of people.

The beginning of the war. After just two weeks, Zaluzhnyi said: "I have removed ten generals, and one of them even shot himself." And he took credit for this. He said this in an attempt to earn some points or, perhaps, to level the future accusations. Then there was the replacement of brigade commanders simply in the current order.

What kind of clans can there be in the army? Then, it turns into a mafia

Then Zaluzhny's team was replaced by Syrsky's team. As for the "named" teams, I don't understand it at all because everyone took an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people. And if they are "named", they turn into clans in which serving a particular boss is their highest priority, and the Ukrainian people are relegated to the background. What kind of clans can be in the army?

Then, it turns into a mafia. The team is composed of competent and professional, like-minded people who fulfill socially important missions, not satisfy their own interests or ambitions, including corrupt ones. We have one goal - to defeat the Russian Federation and stop this aggression. And we serve only the Ukrainian people.

Syrsky has a tendency to appoint people to positions based on the principle that "if they are obedient, they are his." This was also evident in Zaluzhnyi.

Syrsky removed about two dozen generals and hundreds of colonels. New ones came in. At the same time, each leader pulled out a certain team of officers from their previous place of service. For example, 20-30 people came to the General Staff from the Land Forces (this is an underestimate).

Others took their positions, and more people were hired to replace them. In other words, we got a group of people in one governing body who had not taken up their positions, and in the second one, and others too. As a result, we had a slump for a certain period in several structures.

Now the question arises: who came? We constantly hear, "Appoint young people; we must remove all the scoops from the army." These young people graduated from Ukrainian universities (I also have questions about their education).

Now, they take a brigade commander and put him in the position of deputy commander-in-chief, meaning that he jumped through four or five levels of command. How can this person, with all due respect to him, quickly master this position? Yes, there was Napoleon. But he is one in hundreds of thousands.

We lose a good brigadier and get an immature head of strategic management, to put it mildly

That is, we are losing a good brigadier and getting an immature, to put it mildly, head of a strategic-level department. This is precisely one of the goals of Russian information and psychological operations, which is realized by the decisions of specific military officials (it is not clear whether they are stupid or stupid, or perhaps profane or something else). They have names.

And there have been three such large-scale replacements. That is, up to a hundred generals and several hundred colonels. And this is only what is visible. In fact, there are much more personnel changes if you take all the governing bodies.

Next, I've always wanted to ask anyone who takes a position by skipping several levels: "Do you yourself consider yourself ready for such a position? Do you understand the scope of tasks ahead of you? Do you have a general vision?" I doubt it. I know this from my own experience. I spent five years as the Chief of Staff of the 8th Corps, plus half a year as the deputy commander. When I became the corps commander, I felt somewhat uncomfortable for about two months, even though everything was familiar. And in wartime, such a rapid career progression becomes a real problem.

The most frightening thing is the lack of trust in new leaders. This is the case in every area. This leads to chaos

Another aspect is how officers of the management body, where a group of new people arrives, feel. They have to vacate their positions. Where should they go? Either to lower positions, to the reserve or to leave the Armed Forces entirely. "If you don't see value in me, then so be it."

The rest think: how will these new people establish the workflow now? This creates psychological tension. And the most frightening thing is the lack of trust in new leaders. Yesterday, you were dictating instructions to them, and today they are issuing orders, while you have two or three years of experience in the position.

This happens in every area. This is where chaos comes from. This is why there is a desire to delegate authority downwards to avoid responsibility for actions. This is why there are no appropriate plans and documents where signatures are required. This is why there is uncertainty, both in yourself and your subordinates.

The third component. Many military theorists and memoirs of commanders emphasize that any headquarters, at any level, will only gain authority among the subordinate units when it can provide them with tangible support. Not just by issuing instructions, directives, and orders but practically. It must have the means and resources to replenish and support them or even take part in the task execution.

If this is absent, all these management bodies lose authority, and commanders lose leadership. Today, we have no reserves. This is why chaos exists, which leads to statements like Bezuhla's: "Let the brigades fight and disband the rest." What is that? At a minimum, it's an informational sabotage aimed at disorganization and undermining the management system.

Furthermore, officers of higher headquarters rarely visit the units in their areas of responsibility. Do they visit the locations? Or do they just listen to reports by phone and look at maps? These are completely different perceptions of the situation.

Currently, it's become very "fashionable" to issue tasks through orders. When subordinate commanders say, "This is impossible to accomplish," the reaction is extreme: "Oh, impossible? I'm transferring you to another unit, and they'll send you to assault troops. You can explain it to them."

This is intimidation. And it speaks to the leader's immaturity and lack of leadership. This also contributes to the chaos.

Another issue is the lack of a junior officer and sergeant corps

The absence of junior officers and sergeants is a major problem. Suppose we see numerous lieutenant colonels and majors in headquarters and rear management groups. In that case, this doesn't mean that the units at the front line are adequately staffed with junior officers and sergeants. This issue of filling lower ranks existed even in peacetime and is even more acute now. And this is the category that suffers the most losses.

Another point. The Law "On Military Duty and Military Service" provides specific terms for obtaining military ranks. With the introduction of martial law, these terms are halved. However, everyone — those at the front, rear personnel, and instructors at the National Defense University — advances through this shortened system. As a result, we end up with many colonels and a lack of lieutenants, captains, and majors—leaders at the platoon-company-battalion level in the troops.

The same situation applies to service time. I have long raised the issue that service time should count differently if you directly participate in combat. Specifically, three months at the front line should count as twice the time, while the rest counts as usual. But no, we do things differently. This has led to an increase in the number of senior officers who are putting pressure on the rest. And now there's talk of "letting everyone go." This is why we face failures at the tactical level, which provokes chaos and staffing problems.

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