Статті

How air raid alerts are paralyzing Kyiv

What helps you stay sane? Nothing! That is roughly how Kyiv residents have been describing their state of mind over the past week. Air raid alerts keep sounding one after another. What is that noise in the sky? A Ukrainian fighter jet or an enemy Shahed drone? Most likely, the latter.

Texty.org.ua analyzed how air raid alerts were distributed throughout the day in late August and how much working time they cost.

After August 26, Russia sharply intensified its drone attacks on Kyiv and the surrounding region. It seems Russian jet-powered drones have moved into the capital’s skies. But as air raid alerts skyrocketed, the workday was shattered into short stretches of time. The city was brought to a standstill.

Читати українською

Air raid alerts take over the day

Until recently, air raid alerts in the capital were relatively short and rarely affected daytime hours.

From August 27 to 30, Kyiv was under air raid alerts 46 times.

On Thursday, August 27, the capital spent a record 14 hours under air raid alerts — about 60% of the day. On August 28 and 29, the figure was nearly 11 hours each. On Sunday, August 30, more than four hours were spent under air raid alerts during the day.

Disrupting the workday

If Russian missiles and drones once kept Kyiv residents from sleeping, they are now keeping them from working, studying, and doing all the things people normally do during the day. The number of air raid alerts matters just as much as their total duration.

One four-hour alert and four one-hour alerts may add up to the same amount of time, but in the second case, people have to stop working several times, go to a shelter, return, and start again. That means more canceled meetings, delivery delays, service disruptions, and more time spent getting to a shelter or going home.

Ultimately, even without direct hits, an attack can reduce the productivity of the country’s largest financial and industrial hub simply through constant stops and restarts.

The threat is evolving faster than the response

Ukraine has lost several months that could have been used to adapt to jet-powered drones. The first reports of Russia using the Shahed-238 in Ukraine emerged in January 2024, while the mass deployment of Russia’s Geran-3 began in 2025. The threat was known well in advance, yet there is still no effective response.

Just as efforts to adapt to these new means of air attack needed to be accelerated, Volodymyr Zelenskyy decided to reshuffle the government and dismiss the defense minister, who was closely involved in many of the mechanisms governing military technology — from procurement to supporting development and research.

Regardless of Mykhailo Fedorovʼs personal role in these processes, a change in leadership at any ministry disrupts its work for at least several months.

During the full-scale war, Zelenskyy has reshuffled the government far more often than any Ukrainian president did in peacetime, doing so through highly centralized decision-making that harms the country.

Meanwhile, the enemy is adapting rapidly, improving its weapons and intensifying attacks on cities far from the frontline.

Ukraine urgently needs a stable mechanism for anticipating new technological threats, developing solutions, and adapting its defense system accordingly.

Instead, we are heading into winter with heightened risks to the energy system, logistics, and critical infrastructure.

alerts data journalism drones eng kyiv missiles shahed war